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Special Comment
By CHABLEs W. SHu.L*
LEGISLATURE AND THE PROCESS
OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
In the welter of controversy over the apportionment of legisla-
tures at the level of the American States, there has been a failure
to recognize how many subsidiary issues and processes have
additionally been caught in the range of the current conflict. In
the wake of the June 15, 1964, decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims' that all state legislative
chambers must be substantially based upon population, and as
equally districted on that basis as may be possible of attainment,
what significant side issues, secondary to the immediate crisis,
are capable of definition and denomination?
Among these corollary issues is that of the entire process of
constitution-making and alteration or amendment of the basic
law of the states. What is at stake here is this. Of the methods
of amending state constitutions found in the United States, the
two most common involve in some way action by the legislatures,
and consequently the crucial issue of apportionment and dis-
tricting. Only amendment by popularly initiated proposal escapes
contact with legislative bodies themselves as integral to the
process of amendment of state constitutions.
Direct legislative proposal of state constitutional amendments
by the law making body of any state, or resort to a constitutional
convention for general revision of a state government, necessarily
requires action by the very legislative bodies under attack, as
being unrepresentative, unconstitutionally apportioned, and alto-
gether illegal assemblies.
In forty-nine of the states, constitutional amendments may be
proposed by action of the legislature. New Hampshire is the lone
* Professor of Political Science, Wayne State University.
1 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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exception since in that state proposal of amendments must be
consummated by a constitutional convention. All of these fifty
states would present what are known as rigid constitutions,
meaning that extraordinary procedures are utilized to effect con-
stitutional changes, and that the routine operation of the ordinary
law-making process does not suffice for this purpose.
Nineteen states2 require a two-thirds vote of their legislatures
to propose specific constitutional amendments. Seven more pre-
scribe a three-fifths vote.3 A majority vote is specified by an
additional seventeen states.4 There are further variations in the
legislative method of proposal which must be noted.
Connecticut asks that her House of Representatives first
propose the measure by a majority vote, and then requires that
both chambers in the next session approve the measure by a
two-thirds majority.5 Hawaii requires approval at two successive
sessions if the original votes on a proposed amendment are
majorities less than two-thirds.6 Massachusetts decrees that the
constitutional majority for the proposal of amendments to the
fundamental law of that Commonwealth shall be a majority of
members elected, sitting in joint session.7 New Jersey has an
option; either three-fifths of all members of each house, or a
majority of all members of each chamber for two successive
sessions." In New Mexico, amendments dealing with certain
sections on elective franchise or education must be proposed by
a three-fourths vote of the entire bodyY Tennessee turns in a
provision that there must be a majority of members elected voting
for the measure on its first passage and two-thirds of those elected
on the second action on the proposed amendment. 10 Vermont is
also different; thre two-thirds of the Senate and a majority of the
House are required on the first passage; the second confirming
2 Alaska, California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, South Carolina, Texas, Utah,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.3 Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Ohio.
4 Arizona, Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Virginia, and Wisconsin.5 Constitution of Connecticut, Article XI.
6Constitution of Hawaii, Article XVI, Section 3.
7Massachusetts Constitution, Article IX of Amendments.
8 Constitution of New Jersey, Article IX. paragraph 1.
9 Constitution of New Mexico, Article XIX, Section 1.
10 Constitution of Tennessee, Article XI, Section 3.
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trip through the Vermont chambers demands but a majority in
both."
in Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts,
Nevada, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin an amendment
proposed by the legislature to the state constitution must be
passed in two successive legislative sessions. Fourteen states are
found in this category.
It is not meant that there should be a lengthy review of this
particular mode of proposing state constitutional amendments.
These facts have been detailed and set forth with one objective:
to demonstrate that there must necessarily be a very close con-
nection, almost integral and elemental in character, between a
state legislature and its use as an amending agent, and in turn the
structure and composition, the apportionment and districting of
the legislative body itself.
In the American states there are these practices with relation
to constitutional conventions which will be noted. First is the fact
that in all states utilizing constitutional conventions as a means of
revising or amending their basic law, there is the requirement
that such a convention must, in effect be called. While a number
of states make provision for the periodic submission of the ques-
tion of a call for a constitutional convention to the electors, in all
of them it is either a specific power of the legislature to do this or
it exists as an optional, discretionary route to reform.
Twenty-one of the states'" decree that a two-thirds majority
in each chamber of the legislature is requisite to place the ques-
tion of a call for a constitutional convention upon the ballot.
Nebraska requires a three-fifths vote of its unicameral Senate.
Nineteen more make provision for a majority vote in favor of the
submission of a call for a constitutional convention. In a group of
states, Arkansas, Connecticut, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, and Texas, the constitution does not provide
for the calling of a constitutional convention, but legislative
authority to call such a body has been established in practice by
statute, opinions of Attorneys General, and court decisions. In
11 Constitution of Vermont, Section 68.
12 Here I have relied upon Book of the States 1964-65, Table of Data on
page 13.
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Indiana, New Jersey, North Dakota, and Vermont, the constitu-
tion does not provide for the calling of a constitutional convention
and there appears to be no established procedure in this regard.
Mandatory submission of the question of a call for a constitutional
convention at regularly recurrent intervals is resorted to by an
additional group of states, without denial of this power to the
legislature to act at other times.
The next area of concern in this study has to do with the
composition and structure of the state constitutional conventions.
Not merely do these bodies require the extraordinary action of a
call, but they too have to have their memberships established and
related to what we would otherwise call an electoral or repre-
sentative basis. This groundwork is either fixed by constitutional
provision or remains free to be set up as the legislature of the
state in question may desire at the time of the calling of a
constitutional convention. Attention will now be centered upon
this phase of the apportionment problem.
As was indicated earlier, four of the American states make no
provision at all for the call or structure of a constitutional con-
vention, and there appears to be no established procedure in this
regard.'3 Another group of states make no specific provision for
constitutional conventions in their own individual basic docu-
ments, but practice, and legal opinions and decisions have
sustained such employment of the convention procedure in the
amendment or revision of constitutions. Here all details of
structure will be largely at the discretion of the legislature itself.
The positions of the states with regard to the membership
and apportionment of state constitutional convention delegates
will exemplify these situations which we will enumerate.
1. No provisions for convention at all.
2. No specific provisions for conventions but pragmatic pro-
cedures have been established.
3. Where constitutional conventions are authorized, but no
provisions are specifically made as to mode or organization
of such bodies.
13 Again reliance for this and the immediate ensuing paragraphs has been
placed upon Book of the States 1964-65, Table on Constitutional Conventions,
p. 15.
[Vol. 53,
SPECFAL CODMVENT
4. Where discretion is constitutionally vested in the legisla-
ture with no directions whatsoever.
5. Where discretion on the part of the legislature exists, but
some limitations are imposed by specific constitutional
provisions.
6. Where the pattern is set upon the basis of previous, pre-
statehood practice in terms of constitutional convention
structure and composition.
7. Those instances where detailed provisions relate the ap-
portionment and districting of constitutional convention
delegates to the regular legislative bases of representation
and districting.
A group of four states, Indiana, New Jersey, North Dakota,
and Vermont, would exemplify the first of these seven situations
or positions since the state constitution does not provide for the
calling of a constitutional convention, and there appears to be no
established procedure in this regard. In another group of states,
there is no specific authorization for constitutional convention but
pragmatic and quite practical acceptance of their use has been
made, predicated upon the cumulative force of precedent and
judicial decisions supporting such actions in the past. Seven
different states fall into this category, i.e., Arkansas, Connecticut,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Texas.
In these situations, the effective power and discretion of the
legislatures in initiating procedures for the call and in the specific
structures of the conventions themselves will be great and
potentially be affected by the apportionment and districting
patterns of these law-making bodies themselves.
The third situation outlined above was that where constitu-
tional conventions are authorized in the individual states, but no
provisions are specifically made as to the mode of organizing such
bodies. It would appear that Alabama, Arizona, Maine, Missis-
sippi, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Vir-
ginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin would constitute this class of
states. In Iowa and Kansas, the legislature is directed to provide
for the apportionment and election of the delegates to the con-
stitutional convention.
1965]
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Georgia leaves the matter to legislative discretion but pre-
scribes population as nearly equal as may be possible as the basis
upon which these delegates are to be apportioned and districted
for purposes of election. 4 In Idaho a minimum number is fixed
at twice the membership of the most numerous branch of the
state legislature; that body has discretion to vary this number of
delegates above that basic limit defined. 5 Nebraska may have no
more than 100 persons in any constitutional convention called
in that state; but the legislature defines the manner of electing
these convention members and establishes their particular dis-
tricts.Y0
Likewise Nevada sets a minimum equal to the total of her two
chambers; again the legislature has the power and the discre-
tionary right to determine upon a greater universe of convention
delegates. 7 New Mexico demands as many members in any
convention in that state as there are representatives in her lower
chamber, but apparently does not require that they come from
the identical districts.' 8
Wyoming calls for double the number of the most numerous
branch as a minimum.'9 Washington decrees the minimum num-
ber of conventions seats as equal to the most numerous branch of
her legislature.20 South Carolina echoes her most numerous
branch or House of Representatives as the desired number of
seats in a constitutional convention in that state.2' While Utah
sets the total legislative membership as the base for the con-
vention.22
It would seem, however, that discretion does vest in the
legislature to increase the corps of delegates in a convention above
these prescribed minima; thus some power abides in the law
making body in this matter.
This brings the discourse down to the last two situations
posited above. The norm for these is the containment of legisla-
14 Constitution of Georgia, Article XIII, paragraph 2.
'5 Constitution of Idaho, Article 20, Section 3.
16 Constitution of Nebraska, Article XVI, Section 2.
17 Constitution of Nevada, Article 16, Section 2.
18 Constitution of New Mexico, Article 19, Section 2.
'9 Constitution of Wyoming, Article XIX, Section 3.2 0 Constitution of Washington, Article XXIII, Section 2.
21 Constitution of South Carolina, Article XVI, Section 3.
22 Constitution of Utah, Article XXIII, Section 2.
[Vol. 53,
SPECTAL C01afENT
ive discretion to a great degree by constitutional stipulations.
Alaska 3 and Hawaii24 are seemingly bound to follow the set up
used in 1955 and 1950 respectively in the calling and organiza-
tional structure of their pre-statehood conventions.
California has a membership limit in that no convention may
exceed in its total membership that of the two chambers of her
bicameral legislature, and in the further provision that these con-
stitutional convention delegates are to be chosen in the same
manner as are its state legislators. 5 Colorado decrees a conven-
tion of twice the number of its Senate to be elected in the same
manner and from the selfsame senatorial districts. 6
Delaware prescribes 41 members for a convention; two from
each of the three counties of the state, and one apiece from the
35 present representative districts.27 Florida's constitutional con-
ventions equal in number of delegates the total membership of its
House of Representatives and according to the constitution of this
state these convention delegates are to be apportioned in the same
way as the House of Representatives.
Illinois establishes her constitutional convention membership
as double that of her Senate, elected in the same way and from
the same districts.29 Kentucky duplicates her House of Repre-
sentatives in number and electoral areas 0  Maryland 31 and
Michigan32 allot one delegate for each member of their legislative
chambers and utilizes the existing House and Senate districts for
purposes of distribution throughout the state in question. Min-
nesota employs her House of Representatives, numerically and
electorally as the basis for any constitutional convention."
Missouri chooses fifteen delegates from the state at large plus
two from each Senatorial district.3 4 Montana decrees that her
constitutional conventions shall have the same number of persons
as does her House of Representatives; they are to be selected in
2 3 Constitution of Alaska, Article XIII, Section 2.
24 Constitution of Hawaii, Article XV, Section 2.
25 Constitution of California, Article XVIII, Section 2.26 Constitution of Colorado, Article XIX, Section 1.
27 Constitution of Delaware, Article XWI, Section 1.
2 Constitution of Florida, Article XVII, Section 2.29 Constitution of Illinois, Article XIV, Section 1.
30 Constitution of Kentucky, Section 259.
31 Constitution of Maryland, Article XIV, section 2.
M'Constitution of Michigan, Article XII, Section 3.33 Constitution of Minnesota, Article XIB, Section 2.
34 Constitution of lN.fissouri, Article XII, Section 3a.
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the same manner, at the same 5 places, and from the same
districts as are the members of her lower chamber.
New Hampshire uses her General Court, or lower chamber,
apportionment as the legal basis for picking delegates to her
recurrent constitutional conventions, 6 New York provides for the
choice of 15 delegates at large plus three from each senatorial
district of the state.87 South Dakota uses her House of Repre-
sentatives as her guide both as to number of convention delegates
and the areas from which they are to be elected.8
This review of data relevant to the amendment and revision of
state constitutions has been presented, not as an exercise in
intellectual pleasure, but to demonstrate the close connection
and dependence of this process upon state legislatures and state
representative systems. Disturb or challenge the latter, invalidate
them, and the expanding ripples of development involve the
machinery by which the seemingly required reforms are to be
fashioned and proposed. This being true, the old maxium of quis
custodit custodes (who will watch the watchers) must be kept
forward in the minds of those seeking solutions. Can institutions
needing to be changed be altered by others themselves suscepti-
ble?
35 Constitution of Montana, Article XIX, Section 8.36 Constitution of New Hampshire, Article 99.
37 Constitution of New York, Article XIX, Section 2.38 Constitution of South Dakota, Article XIII, Section 2.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Volume 53 Spring, 1965 Number 3
EDITORIAL BOARD
1964-1965
DONALD S. Mum
Editor-in-Chief
LARRY D. GARMON
Associate Editor
GEORGE W. MMLLS
Note Editor
JOE HA RSON
JOsEPH T. BURc
PAuL E. HnmoNYros
MARx E. Goman.y
JoHN M. DmXoN, JR.
LAURENcE W. GRAUSE
XMkARsiA. Loy
Scorry BAEsLmn
JAmEs L. Av ur
JAIfs A. SmrIFrrr
BAmi.ow Ropp
J.AmEs A. KEGE=
WMIAM G. KOHLHEPP
Comment Editor
GENE LEWTER
LEON L. HOLLON
JERRY P. RHOADS
ROGER M. OLIVER
CoURTNEY F. EIAS
ROBERT J. GREENE
ALEx W. ROSE
HUNTER DumAim
RALPH R. KnE
HARRY M. SNYDER, JR.
EDWIN P. ABELL
R. Crnis MAmcLE
JOHN BATr
Faculty Editor
FACULTY OF THE COLLEGE OF LAW
ex officio
MRs. MARTHA HUFF, Secretary
The Kentucky Law Journal is published in Fall, Winter, Spring, and Summer
by the College of Law, University of Kentucky, Lexington. Second class postage
paid at Lexington, Kentucky 40506.
Communications of either an editorial or a business nature should be ad-
dressed to Kentucky Law Journal, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky.
The purpose of the Kentucky Law Journal is to publish contributions of inter-
est and value to the legal profession, but the views expressed in such contributions
do not necessarily represent those of the Journal.
The Journal is a charter member of the Southern Law Review Conference
and the National Conference of Law Reviews.
Subscription price: $5.00 per year $2.00 per number

